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historical knowledge return even in theories designed to repress them. In pursuing both of these goals, I focus on the work of Hayden White ' (Ankersmit, 1983: 122) . For (Connolly and Keutner, 1988: 14 (Iggers, 1965: 304-5 (White, 1987: 90 (White, 1987: 97 But even if we grant this, it is the reflection that we perceive, not the thing reflected. By directing our attention to the reflection of things that appear in the text, a semiological approach to intellectual history fixes us directly before the process of meaning production that is the special subject of intellectual history.... (White, 1982: R3sen, 1987: 276, 285-6; Koselleck, 'Historia magistra Vitae', in Koselleck, 1985 White, 1982: 286-8 (Rorty, 1982: 166 (White, 1959: xxii Presumably as a result of his developing conviction that historians move 'to the imperatives of narrative discourse' (White, 1975: 49) . White too finds the distinction between historism and its imagined conceptual antitheses 'virtually worthless' (White, 1975: 49, 53 (Kellner, 1989 : 193-227 (Kellner, 1989:291 (Ayer, 1946: 102-13 (Kellner, 1989 To invoke a Kuhnian distinction, we must distinguish between normal history and revolutionary history (see, e.g., Kuhn, 1970: 35-42 (Fish, 1989: 313 (Fine, 1990: 110 (Beard, 1956: 317) . Essentially these assumptions are noted by Connolly and Keutner (1988) and Habermas (1988) . For a summary criticism of Dilthey endorsing both the linkages and the assumptions I suggest, see Ricoeur (1981: 48-54 (Rossi, 1975: 16 ). This list is in basic agreement with the summary judgments of D. Lee and R. Beck in their much cited article (Lee and Beck, 1954: 577) . Historists reject positivism because it is scientistic and ahistorical in its approach to understanding, but they reject as well a prioristic approaches to historical knowledge. Hayden White offers an interesting typology of historicisms which distinguishes between a naturalistic historicism which 'sees man as the tool of hypostatized physiochemical process', a metaphysical historicism which 'sees man as the tool of an abstract idea governed ... by the "cunning of reason"', and an aesthetic historicism which 'assumed that ... a true vision of history must begin not with the object, the past, but with the subject, the historian living in the present' (White, 1959: xx-xxi). 30 The notion of aesthetic historicism is the one which proves crucial, as discussion in Part III shows. 4 As Leonard Krieger argues for the case of Ranke, the drive to reconcile a quest for universal historical connections and a concern for the particularities and individuality of events is central to certain forms of historism (see Krieger, 1975 (1986, 1989a,b) (Gossman, 1990: 315-16) (White, 1989b) (1989) . 28 For an anticipation of this point, see Gossman (1990: 392-3, fn. 28 (Fish, 1989: 307-8 
